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Any Act or Promise
Other authorities, however, hold that detriment to the prom-
isee does not have to consist of legal detriment, but that any
act or promise given for a promise is sufficient detriment to
answer the requirements of consideration. A promise by an
infant to marry an adult is held to be sufficient consideration
for the adult's promise,88 though the contract is voidable by the
infant. The infant has promised to perform, it is said, if he
chooses. The giving up, or the promise to give up, the privilege
of single blessedness would be legal detriment, and therefore the
adult's promise would be consideration for the infant's in the
sense of legal detriment, but it is hard to see how there can be
legal detriment in the sense that a person has promised to sur-
render a legal privilege when he has promised to do so if he
chooses, or unless he chooses not to do so (if such is the case).
Hence it is said the only detriment to the promisee in such cases
is the making of the promise. The same thing is true of all
voidable promises,8 9 and probably of conditional promises.9 0
Yet in such cases we have true contracts, and that means con-
88 Holt v. Ward Clarenojeux, 2 Strange 937.
89 Atwell v. Jenkins, 163 Mass. 362; Williston, Contracts, Sec. 105.
90 McMullan v. Dickinson Co., 66 Minn. 405; Coleman v. Eyre, 45 N. Y.
38.
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sideration. One party simply has a defense of which he may
avail himself if the other tries to hold him to the contract. There-
fore the theory of consideration adopted in such cases it is
thought must be that any act or promise is sufficient detriment
to the promisee to constitute consideration. In compromise
cases, also, unless the privilege of suit is surrendered, it is im-
possible to see how one person has in unilateral cases surren-
dered anything more than an act, and in bilateral cases promised
anything but a promise.91 But it is contended the best illustra-
tions of the repudiation of the theory that detriment to the
promisee, or the promise thereof, must be any act or promise
with reference to which a person has legal capacity, and of the
adoption of the theory that it may consist merely of any act or
promise, are found in the cases of the performance, or the
promise to perform, a pre-existing legal duty. If the act or
the promise is given to the person to whom the promisor is
already under existing duty, there is neither legal detriment to
the promisee nor legal benefit to the promisor. If the act or
promise is given to a third person, it is hard to see how there
is legal detriment, though it has been argued that there is legal
benefit. For this reason the English cases of type one and most
of the United States cases bf both types hold that there is no
consideration. 92 However, the English cases of type two and
some United States cases of both types hold that there is con-
sideration in such cases,93 and the theory of these cases must
be discovered. The courts in both types of cases apparently
91 Cook v. Songat, 1 Leon. 103, 4 Leon. 31; Seward & Scales v. Mitchell,
1 Cold. 87; Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326; Sweitzer v. Heasley, 13
Ind. App. 567.
92 Foakes v. Beer, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605; Lingenfelder v. Wainwright
Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392; McDevitt
v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515; Davis v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504; Harris v. Cassady,
107 Ind. 158; Mader v. Cool, 14 Ind. App. 299; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind.
328; Williston, Contracts, Sec. 130, and the rule has been extended to cases
of discharge of contracts. Foakes v. Beer, supra.
93 Sherwood v. Woodward, Cro. Eliz. 700; Shadwell v. Shadwell, 30 L. J.
C. P. 145; Scotson v. Pegg, 6 Hurl. & N. 295; Lattimore v. Harsen, 14
John. 330; Monroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298; Abbott v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433;
DeCieco v. Schweizer et al., 221 N. Y. 431; Schwartzreich, v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc., 103 Misc. Rep. 214.
The writer cannot agree with Mr. Williston that these cases were de-
cided on the ground of benefit to the promisor. In them there was some
talk of benefit, but the judges tried harder to find detriment than to find
benefit; and the writer at least cannot understand why anyone should
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proceed on the theory of detriment to the promisee rather than
benefit to the promisor. Hence it is maintained that they adopt
as their theory of consideration detriment to the promisee, or
the promise thereof, in the sense of any act or promise. This is
certainly true of the cases of type one,94 where the second at-
tempted contract is between the same parties, unless the power to
desire to introduce into the law of consideration another difficult theory
when it already has too many, especially in view of the fact that it will
explain only cases of type two and not those of type one, and in view of
the fact that the law of quasi contracts is supposed to cover recovery for
benefits conferred whenever in equity and good conscience the one benefited
ought to pay therefor. Edson v. Poppe, 24 S. D. 466; Sharp v. Hoopes,
74 N. J. L. 191.
The explanation of some of the courts that the old contract is mutually
rescinded and that then the parties enter into a new contract is not satis-
factory, because in practically all cases it is contrary to the facts and a
mere fiction. The courts have really adopted a new theory of considera-
tion, and they would do better to say so than to pretend that the facts
are what they are not in order to escape this contingency. Lingenfelder v.
Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578. The explanation of other courts
that there is consideration, if a person encounters new and unforeseen
difficulties and goes on or promises to go on and complete the work for a
new promise of greater compensation, Michaud v. MacGregor, 61 Minn.
198; Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220; King v. Duluth, etc., R. Co., 61 Minn.
482, is also hard to understand; unless thereby they mean either (1) this
new and unforeseen difficulty was not embraced within the original pre-
existing duty, or (2) that it was an implied condition subsequent termi-
nating the original contract, or (3) that it was ground for rescission in
equity because of a mutual assumption as to a matter of performance.
Equally fallacious is the explanation that a person has a right to sue for
damages and that waiving this is sufficient consideration, Evans v. Oregon,
etc., Ry., 58 Wash. 429; Pierce v. Walton, 20 Ind. App. 66, for the other
party must furnish consideration, and he has no right to pay damages;
also the explanation that the power to break a contract is sufficient con-
sideration, because such power causes no detriment to the promisee.
In the case of DeCicco v. Schweizer, supra, a third person (father of
one of the other parties) promised two other parties (the daughter of the
third and a young man), who were engaged to be married, that he would
pay them $2,500 a year during the daughter's life time, for their marriage,
but after about ten years refused to keep up the payments longer. He
was sued and his defense was that there was no consideration for his
promise, but Judge Cardozo found consideration for his promise in the
giving up by the parties under contract to marry each other of their
privilege of rescinding the contract. Judge Cardozo's explanation makes
the consideration not "benefit to the promisor" nor "any act or promise,"
but a "qegal right, power, privilege, or immunity;" but it is certainly
rational.
94 Lattimore v. Harsen and Monroe v. Perkins, supra, note 93.
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break a contract is recognized as consideration; and it is true
of the cases of type two where a third party is brought in unless
the theory of benefit to the promisor or Judge Cardozo's ration,
alization is accepted to explain them.
The late Dean Ames championed the theory that detriment to
the promisee did not have to be an act or promise with reference
to which a person had legal capacity but that any act or promise
was enough, and he maintained that such theory came nearest
to reconciling the cases.95 He defined consideration "as any act
or forbearance" (unilateral), or promise (bilateral) "by one
person given in exchange for a promise by another."96
If consideration was defined as Mr. Ames defined it, there
would be found in the law of consideration nothing which is not
already found in the law of agreement. In every unilateral
agreement there would be an act, and in every bilateral agree-
ment there would be a promise, given in exchange for a promise.
Hence it would add nothing to require consideration, and it
would not be necessary to give it separate study or discussion.
The law of agreement, with its requirement of offer and accept-
ance, would cover everything.
What, then, is the meaning of "detriment to the promisee?"
It is impossible to answer this question. If it means any act or
promise with reference to which a person has legal capacity,
95 "The examination of our three classes of cases, of which Callisher v.
Bischoffsheim, Shadwell v. ShadweU, and Foakes v. Beer, are the con-
spicuous illustrations, makes it clear that the authorities cannot be recon-
ciled with any theory of consideration. We must either adopt the view
that consideration is any act or forbearance not already due from the
promisee, and treat the first two classes of cases as exceptions, indefensible
on principle, but established as law in England, and either already rep-
resenting, or likely to represent, the predominant judicial opinion in this
country, or else we must adopt the other view, that consideration is any
act or forbearance by the promisee, and regard the third class of cases,
of which Foakes v. Beer is the type, as an exception contrary to principle,
but sanctioned by the highest judicial authority in England and the United
States." Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 339.
The writer does not agree with Mr. Ames' interpretation of the case of
Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, because he thinks in that case there was the
surrender of a legal privilege, but he does agree with Mr. Ames' general
point of view.
96 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 323.
Many early cases make the statement that a promise for a promise is
sufficient consideration. Strangeborough and Warner's Case, 4 Leon. 3;
Nichols v. Raynbred, Hob. 88; Goring v. Goring, Yelv. 11; II Street, Found.
Legal Lia., 107-111, 135.
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that is any legal right, privilege, power, or immunity, the in-
stances where any act or promise has been held sufficient con-
sideration may have to be classed as exceptions. If it means
any act or promise, then, according to the majority view, the
cases of forbearance to sue on invalid claims and of performance
of pre-existing legal duties will have to be classed as exceptions,
and it will be a work of supererogation to talk about legal detri-
ment, for "any act or promise" is the broader term and would
include all cases of legal detriment. Of course any act or prom-
ise, which is also a legal right, or legal privilege, or legal power,
or legal immunity, is always sufficient consideration; but per-
haps it cannot be said that the act or promise must be one of
these, for apparently in many cases it may be merely any act
or promise. If we were sure that consideration in Anglo-Ameri-
can law had to be detriment to the promisee in one or the other
of these senses, our problem would be simplified, but we have
already learned that the notion of benefit to the promisor is one
which cannot be entirely ignored, and we are going to learn
that there are other notions of consideration which cannot be
forgotten. 97
Can it be said that detriment to the promisee, in either of the
above senses, is required by Anglo-American law? Nobody
knows. All that can be said is, that in one of these senses it is
required and used more than anything else.
Bargain Theory
Whatever doubt there may be as to benefit to the promisor
and detriment to the promisee as consideration, there is no doubt
that so far as these forms of consideration are concerned, if they
are to be sufficient consideration, they must be given in exchange
for a promise. This evidently means that the common law
theory of consideration is something more than the will theory
of the Roman law and the evidence theory of Lord Mansfield,
and yet it is not the equivalent theory, or the injurious reliance
theory: it is the bargain theory.9 8 It means that something
97 It must be borne in mind, also, that the text-writers are not agreed
that there is no distinction between unilateral agreements and bilateral
agreements. Williston, Contracts, Sees. 103-103d, Sec. 131a; Street, Found.
Legal Lia., 107-121; Corbin, in 27 Yale L. Jour. 374-381; Leake, Contracts
(lst ed.), 314; (2d ed.), 612, 613.
98 Pound, Introduction to Philosophy of Law, 269-276; Pillam et al. v.
Van Mierop et al., 3 Burr. 1663.
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must be given as the price for a promise. Gratuitous promises
will not be enforced. The consideration does not have to be
adequate. 99 It does not have to be the inducing cause of the
promise.1 00 It is enough if it is given in exchange for, or as the
price for, a promise.10 1 Here again we have the same idea that
we have in the law of agreement. 0 2
From what source came the requirement of consideration now
under discussion? It cannot be found in the tort action of spe-
cial assumpsit before it became a contract action, for at that
time the detriment to the promisee was not given in exchange
for the promise but followed as a consequence of failure to per-
form the promise (injurious reliance). Mr. Salmond contends
that the requirement that whatever is consideration must be
given for a promise was imported from equity. 03  Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes contends that it was imported from debt, with
its requirement of quid pro quo. 0 4 Both equity and debt
had similar requirements in this respect. This notion,
taken from one or both sources, was amalgamated with the idea
of detriment to the promisee to give the dual modern require-
ment that the act or promise must be given in exchange for an-
other promise.
For this reason love and affection of the promisor,10 5 an offer
of a gift with burdens, 0 6 performance of an act without a
99 Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29.
100 Justice Holmes' statement to the contrary in Wisconsin, etc., Co. v.
Powers, 191 U. S. 379, is not supported by the weight of authority. Under-
wood Typewriter Co. -v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522. Note also cases
of unilateral contracts, where the promise may induce the act, but the act
does not induce the promise.
101 Brawn et al. v. Lyford, 103 Me.. 362. Hence liability in gratuitous
bailments should not be explained on contract ground but on the ground
of an obligation imposed by law without contract. Carr et al. v. Maine
Cent. R. R., 78 N. H. 502; Fooly and Preston's Case, 1 Leon. 297; Wheatley
v. Low, Cro. Jac. 668; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 920, contra.
102 Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131; J. H. Queal & Co. v. Peterson, 138
Iowa 514; Schroyer v. Thompson, 262 Pa. 282. Cf. Thomas v. Thomas,
2 Q. B. 851, and Brackenbury et al. v. Hodgkin et al., 116 Me. 399; Wil-
liams v. Carwardine, 4 Barn. & Adol. 621; Dawkcins v. Sappington, 26 Ind.
199, contra.
103 Salmond, History of Contracts, 3 Select Anglo-American Essays,
325-329, 336, 337.
104 Holmes, Common Law, 286.
105 Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29; Denman v. McMahin, 37 Ind. 241.
106 Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131. See note 102.
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knowledge of or an intent to accept an offer of reward for that
act, and a promise for a past consideration, 0 7 are all cases
where it has been held that there was no consideration, because
in such cases the promisee gives nothing in exchange for, or to
buy, the promise. Charitable subscription and other gift cases
and moral consideration cases are also cases where nothing is
given in exchange for the promise, and if the courts were con-
sistent, they would hold that there is no consideration, but since
they have not been consistent these cases will have to be ex-
plained on some other ground. But if it is found that some act
(either a mere act, or a right, power, privilege, or immunity)
or the promise thereof was given in exchange for a promise,
the courts will find consideration. 0 8 Can it be said, then, that
it is Anglo-American law that something must always be given
for a promise? No one knows, for there are other forms of
consideration which are sometimes sufficient where this is not
true.
Equivalent Theory
In Anglo-American law, the Equivalent Theory has been
adopted only in the case of exchanges of money.10 9 The Ameri-
can Law Institute makes this theory apply also in the case of the
exchange of fungible goods for goods of the same kind and
quality. However the Equivalent Theory is really the Bargain
Theory raised to the nth power, and therefore, need not be
treated further as exceptional.
Injurious Reliance Theory
Historically, the theory of injurious reliance, as considera-
tion, has very good support. It was the basis of recovery in the
1O7Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234; Moore v. Elmer, 180 Mass 15;
Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207; Boston v. Dodge, 1 Blackf. 23; Clodfelter v.
Hulett, 72 Ind. 137. It should be noted that the requirement under discus-
sion applies only in that part of the law which has grown up out of the
action of special assumpsit. It has no application in that part of the
law which has grown up out of the action of general assumpsit, except as
it has anomalously been extended to inferred contracts. Precedent debt
was the early requirement in general assumpsit cases, and a quasi con-
tract is the modern requirement. Janson v. Colomore, 1 Rolle 396; Slade's
Case, 4 Coke 92b; Sidenham and Worlington's Case, 2 Leon. 224; Rann v.
Hughes, 7 T. R. 350.
108 Thomas u. Thomas, 2 Q. B. 851; Alliance Bankv . Broom, 2 Drew. &
S. 289.
109 Schnell v. Nell, 17 Indiana 29.
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action of special assumpsit when that action was regarded as a
tort action and before it became a contract action. Of course,
the bargain theory has nearly supplanted the injurious reliance
theory, but there are certain places in our law where the injuri-
ous reliance theory still survives, although today the theory goes
under the name of promissory estoppel. Modern cases of prom-
issory estoppel are therefore merely survivals of this old notion.
In Anglo-American law this injurious reliance theory has been
adopted and followed in the following cases: (1) Gratuitous
promises to convey land where the promisee has entered upon
the land and made improvements; 110 (2) gratuitous promises of
a license acted upon so that the licensee has seriously changed
his position;111 (3) charitable subscriptions where acts have
been done in justifiable reliance thereon ;112 (4) gratuitous prom-
ises of other gifts reasonably relied and acted upon to one's
injury ;113 (5) gratuitous undertakings of bailees reasonably re-
lied upon;1 14 and (6) promises of waiver justifiably relied
upon.115 None of these cases can in any way be assimilated
under the bargain theory. Practically all unilateral agreements
can also be explained on the injurious reliance theory, but since
they can also be explained on the bargain theory, it is not cus-
tomary to use the injurious reliance explanation.
Moral Consideration
We have already seen how Lord Mansfield introduced moral
consideration into Anglo-American law, in lieu of the considera-
tion of precedent debt in general assumpsit cases. 116 It is true
that the judges following Lord Mansfield refused to extend the
doctrine of moral consideration to any new cases,117 and later
judges explained the earlier cases on the ground of waiver; but
110 Ames' Cases on Equity, 306-9; Law v. Henry, 39 Ind. 414; Homer v.
Clark, 27 Ind. App. 6.
111 Bassett Manufacturing Co. v. Riley (1925), 9 Fed. (2nd) 138.
112 Presbyterian Church v. Cooper (1889), 112 N. Y. 517; Y. M. C. A. v.
Estill (1913), 140 Ga. 29; Northwestern Conf., etc., v. Myers, 36 Ind. 375.
113 Wilson v. Spray (1920), 145 Ark. 21; Deveomon v. Shaw (1888),
69 Md. 199.
11 4 Siegel v. Spear (1920), 234 N. Y. 479.
115 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co. (1909), 220 Mo.
522; Butt v. Butt et al, 91 Ind. 305.
116 See "General Assumpsit," supra.
117 Binnington v. Wallace, 4 Barn. & Ald. 650; Littlefleld v. Shee, 2
Barn. & Ald. 811; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Adol. & El. 438.
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since the waiver theory is proving untenable, the judges are
having to go back to the ground upon which Lord Mansfield
based his decisions. Lord Mansfield would like to have intro-
duced new doctrines of consideration into all of the law of con-
tracts,118 but his immediate successors were not possessed with
his ambition, so that at last the doctrine of moral consideration
became practically obsolete, except as it survived in a few states
of the Union and except as it still obtained in precedent debt
cases.1 19 But within the last few years there seems to have
been a recrudescence of the theory of moral consideration.
In the case of Bagaeff v. Prokapek,1 20 a note was given for a
commission which the defendant had orally promised to pay the
plaintiff for the sale of land, and the court held the note enforce-
able because it was supported by moral consideration. The oral
promise was void under the statute of frauds, and therefore
was never a legal obligation, but the court held that moral obli-
gation was sufficient to support the promise in spite of that fact.
In the case of Muir v. Kane, et =u.,121 the facts were almost
identical with those in the above case except that the defendant
did not make his promise directly to the plaintiff, and the court
permitted recovery on the ground of moral obligation. On the
"distinction between contracts formerly good, but on which the
right of recovery has been barred by the statute, and those
contracts which are barred in the first instance because of some
legal defect in their execution . . it has seemed to us the
distinction is not sound. The moral obligation to pay for serv-
ices rendered as a broker in selling real estate under an oral
contract where the statute requires such contract to be in writ-
ing is just as binding as is the moral obligation to pay a debt
that has become barred by the statute of limitations. .
The validity of a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of
limitations is not founded on its antecedent legal obligation.
There is no legal obligation to pay such a debt; if there were,
there would be no need for a new promise. The obligation is
moral solely, and, since there can be no difference in character
between one moral obligation and another, there can be no rea-
11s Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1663.
119 Williston, Contracts, Secs. 149-204. See notes 28 and 30, supra.
120 212 Mich. 265.
121 55 Wash. 131. See also, Straus v. Cunningham, 159 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 718; Bentley v. Morse, 14 John. 468, cases cited in notes 28 and
30, and Pierce v. Walton, 20 Ind. App. 66.
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son for holding that one moral obligation will support a promise
while another will not."
Hence it can no longer be said that moral consideration is
not sufficient for a promise, either where there was a prior
legal obligAtion, or where there was none. If moral considera-
tion is sufficient for some promises of each class, why not for
all promises? Moral consideration has none of the character-
istics of the common law consideration of detriment to the
promisee, or even of benefit to the promisor, given for a promise,
and if it should receive general adoption the others would have
to be rejected. Whether, if moral consideration was adopted, it
would remain permanently is doubtful. In Eastwood v. Ken-
yon,122 it was said that it "would annihilate the necessity for
any consideration at all, inasmuch as the mere fact of giving a
promise creates a moral obligation to perform it." Perhaps this
is so. At any rate, whatever is or is going to be the status of
moral consideration, we already have a number of decisions
which have enforced promises simply as such without any re-
quirement of consideration. If moral consideration were not to
have this result and be thus defined, how should it be defined?
It is doubtful if an answer could be given to this question.
What then is the status of moral consideration in Anglo-Ameri-
can law? Nobody knows.
Every Promise Intended to be Binding (Will Theory)
There are many cases where promises have been enforced
simply as promises without any consideration whatever and
without any agreement. Most of these have been promises in
writing, but some have been oral promises. In the case of
Pillans, et al. v. Van Mierop, et al.,123 Lord Mansfield asked "if
any case could be found where the undertaking holden to be
nudum pactum was in writing," and the court in that case up-
held such a promise. Other illustrations of cases where promises
are enforced simply because they were intended to be binding
though without consideration are found in gratuitous declara-
tions of trust, 24 in accommodation indorsers of bills and
notes, 124a in cases of stipulations of parties and their counsel, in
122 11 Adol. & El. 438.
123 3 Burr. 1663.
124 Perry, Trusts, 96; 39 Cyc. 57.
124a Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Sec. 29.
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the case of the enforcement of promises at the suit of third-
party beneficiaries ;125 and, of course, where the seal has not
been abolished, promises under seal are enforced though without
consideration, although the judges sometimes try to bring the
specialty contract within the doctrine of consideration by declar-
ing that the seal raises a presumption of consideration. 126 Re-
cent cases show a still greater tendency to abrogate the require-
ment of consideration and to return to the position of Lord
Mansfield.127
In the case of MeCrillis v. Sutton, et al.,128 where a husband
and wife supposed they had legally adopted a young man when
he was a child but they had not, the court granted specific per-
formance of a written promise of the former that the latter
"should have on the death of the husband (and of the wife) the
same right to their property as if he had been adopted." The
only consideration, if any, in this case was love and affection
and past consideration. There was no present benefit to the
325 Williston, Contracts, Sees. 356, 357, 361, 368, 381.
126 II Street, Found. Leg. Lia, 8-19.
127 Dean Pound has an interesting summary of this branch of the
law: "On the other hand the extent to which courts today are straining
to get away from the bargain theory and enforce promises which are not
bargains and cannot be stated as such is significant. Subscription con-
tracts, gratuitous promises afterwards acted on, promises based on moral
obligations, new promises where a debt has been barred by limitation or
bankruptcy or the like, the torturing of gifts into contracts by equity so
as to enforce pacta donationis specifically in spite of the rule that equity
will not aid a volunteer, the enforcement of gratuitous declarations of
trust, specific enforcement of options under seal without consideration,
specific performance by way of reformation in case of security to a cred-
itor or settlement on a wife or provision for a child, voluntary relinquish-
ment of a defense by a surety and other cases of 'waiver,' release by mere
acknowledgment in some states, enforcement of gifts by way of reforma-
tion against the heir of a donor, 'mandates' where there is no res, and
stipulations of parties and their counsel as to the conduct of and pro-
ceedings in litigation-all these make up a formidable catalogue of excep-
tional or anomalous cases with which the advocate of the bargain theory
must struggle. When one adds the enforcement of promises at suit of
third party beneficiaries, which is making headway the world over, and
enforcement of promises where the consideration moves from a third per-
son, which has strong advocates in America and is likely to be used to
meet the exigencies of doing business through letters of credit, one can
but see that Lord Mansfield's proposition that no promise made as a busi-
ness transaction can be nud-am pactum is nearer realization than we had
supposed." An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 272-3.
128 207 Mich. 58.
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promisor, no detriment to the promisee (either in the sense of
legal detriment or in the sense of any act or promise), no moral
obligation which was once a legal obligation. There was not
even an agreement, and probably no moral obligation. There
was simply a promise in writing. Hence the case is authority
that neither consideration nor agreement is necessary but that
a mere promise intended to be binding is enforceable, at least
if in writing.129
Is it now Anglo-American law that a promise is enforceable




What is consideration in the Anglo-American law of con-
tracts? No one knows. In the first place, in view of the many
decisions which have enforced and are enforcing promises with-
out consideration, no one can be sure that any form of consider-
ation is required by our law. In the second place, even if some
form of consideration is required, no one can say what it is.
Is it precedent debt? Is it moral obligation? Is it the Roman
law causa as developed by equity? Is it quid pro quo? Is it
benefit to the promisor? Is it detriment to the promisee? Is it
the equivalent theory, or the will theory, or the evidence theory,
or the injurious reliance theory, or the bargain theory? Appar-
ently it may be any one of these. This is probably why a promi-
nent text writer has ambiguously defined consideration in a
unilateral contract as "a detriment incurred by the promisee
or a benefit received by the promisor at the request of the
promisee;" and in a bilateral contract as "mutual promises in
each of which the promisor undertakes some act of forbearance
that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to the promisee
129 Other cases in accord are Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305; Brickell v.
Hendricks, 121 Miss. 356; Thomason et al. v. Bischer et al., 176 N. C. 622.
There is a tendency on the part of law as well as equity to enforce delib-
erate promises simply as promises under one pretext or another.
India and at least ten of our states no longer require consideration for
the discharge of a contract. Wald's Pollock, Contracts (3d ed.) 211; Ames,
Lectures on Legal History, 329-340. Many of our states also no longer
require consideration for the transfer of property. In some states a prom-
ise in writing is given the same effect as a promise under seal. Comp.
Laws N. D. 1913, secs. 5828, 5833, 5849, 5881.
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or beneficial to the promisor."'130 But no one would dare say
that any one of these would under all circumstances be a suffi-
cient consideration for a promise. One would doubtless be
safest in tying up to the theory of detriment to the promisee.
The safest generalization is that Anglo-American law has
adopted the bargain theory; that the bargain theory requires
detriment to the promisee; and that detriment to the promisee
(if voidable and conditional contracts are rationalized as in-
stances where each party has given up or promised to give up
a legal right, power, privilege or immunity as in other contracts,
but where one of the parties has a legal power to unmake the
contract), must consist of some legal right, power, privilege or
immunity. Consideration then, could, with the exception of
moral consideration and injurious reliance, be defined as a legal
right, power, privilege or immunity, causing legal detriment to
the promisee, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise.
Certainly a contract drawn according to this theory of con-
sideration would be a well-drawn contract. Yet, it would be
error to say that a contract must have this consideration. There
are too many cases where moral consideration and injurious
reliance theory have been held to be sufficient consideration and
where deliberate promises have been held binding without consid-
eration for such a statement to be accurate. Even the theory of
consideration embodied in this definition is a tort notion whipped
into place and made to do duty as consideration in contracts after
it was covered with all the technicality known to the common law.
It is unlike every other kind of consideration known to man. Its
existence is accidental and due wholly to the fact that assumpsit
was a more popular action than the other contract actions be-
cause tried before a jury, and gradually supplanted them. Had
debt been adapted to the enforcement of promises and tried by
jury our consideration today might be quid pro quo. Had equity
retained its jurisdiction over contracts our consideration might
be some sort of causa. Had covenant been able to withstand
assumpsit, we should probably have no requirement of consider-
ation at all. In spite of the fact that the definition is simple
and seems to be clear, it is difficult to apply. Detriment to the
promisee in the sense named means one thing in one jurisdiction
at one time and another thing in another jurisdiction at the same
time, or in the same jurisdiction at another time. In applying
130 Williston, Contracts, sees. 102, 103f.
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it the courts have resorted to over-fine explanations and hair-
splitting distinctions, and often have reached unreasonable and
irreconcilable conclusions. Insignificant and absurd things have
been held to be sufficient detriment to the promisee. As a result,
the law of consideration has become largely form and technic-
ality, and it is reasonable to maintain that the tort idea of
detriment to the promisee has become as great a load for
assumpsit as quid pro quo was for debt and seal for covenant,
and the action of assumpsit has placed the modern law of con-
tracts into as bad a straight-jacket as the actions of covenant
and debt placed the ancient law.13 1
What should be done about this situation? If the law is to be
simplified and clarified either some one theory of consideration
will have to be adopted by Anglo-American law or some com-
bined theory more explicit and workable than any of the present
combination of theories.
If some one theory were to be adopted, the choice would lie
between two or three. Quid pro quo would not be chosen. It
has already proven itself inadequate because not adapted for
the enforcement of promises as such. Precedent debt, which was
a fictional consideration at one time but now obsolete, offers no
real possibilities. Benefit to the promisor adds nothing to and
has no advantages over detriment to the promisee and bulks so
large as a doctrine in quaswi contracts that it would be unwise to
introduce it into the law of contracts as consideration. The
Roman causa offers no possibilities, because "there is no defin-
able doctrine of causa."132 " The Romans had no theory of
causa, nor did they consider it an essential condition for the
validity of contracts, but they have often applied the principles
of causa."'133 The Roman law and probably the modern civil
law are authority for no consideration more than for a par-
131 "It is significant that although we have been theorizing about con-
sideration for four centuries, our texts have not agreed upon a formula
of consideration, much less our courts upon any consistent scheme of what
is consideration and what is not. It means one thing-we are not exactly
agreed what-in the law of simple contracts, another in the law of nego-
tiable instruments, another in conveyancing under the Statute of Uses and
still another thing-no one knows exactly what-in many cases in equity."
Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 276-7.
132 Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration, 28 Yale L. Jour. 646; Buck-
land, A Textbook of Roman Law, 425.
133 Bry, Principles de droit romain (5th ed.), 502.
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ticular theory of causa.134 Moral consideration would be so likely
to evolve into a requirement of no consideration that it does not
demand separate discussion. While injurious reliance has been
growing in scope in the last few years, it has not as yet become
a large enough theory so that it can bid for exclusive adoption.
This leaves for our choice either the theory of a legal right,
power, privilege, or immunity bargained for and given in ex-
change for a promise, or any act or promise bargained for and
given in exchange for a promise, or the will theory of considera-
tion which would really be the theory of no consideration at all.
The theory of legal right, power, privilege or immunity (or
the promise thereof) bargained for and given in exchange for a
promise could never be adopted as the sole consideration in
Anglo-American law, because in many cases it seems to require
too much, and therefore to be out of harmony with the social
interests of the day. It would require too much in the case of
voidable contracts and conditional contracts, unless they are
rationalized as has been hinted above. It would require too
much in the cases where moral consideration has been held to
be enough. It would also require too much in the cases where
injurious reliance has been held to be enough. Of course, it
requires too much in those cases where promises have been en-
forced without consideration. The decisions in all of these later
cases have been required by what is regarded as the modern
sense of justice. The theory in question, therefore, would be
as liable to accomplish injustice as justice, and it could never
be chosen as an exclusive theory.
Any act or promise bargained for and given in exchange for
a promise would meet the same objections as have been made
to the theory of a legal right, power, privilege, or immunity (or
the promise thereof) bargained for and given in exchange for
a promise, so far as concerns those cases where promises have
been upheld for moral consideration or because of injurious
reliance or without consideration. And it would not, according
to some decisions, be adequate for two types of cases where at
the present time a legal right, power, privilege or immunity
bargained for and given for a promise are required by our law.
These are the forbearance to sue cases and the pre-existing legal
duty cases. So that, if this theory of consideration were
adopted, it is contended these two exceptions would have to be
134 Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration, 28 Yale L. Jour. 633.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
included in it. If it were not for these exceptions the theory of
detriment to the promisee in the sense of any act or promise
bargained for and given in exchange for a promise would have
many things to commend it. It would mean no further con-
sideration than would be required by our modern law of agree-
ment, with its requirement of offer and acceptance either by
act or by promise. In a unilateral agreement, there would be
detriment to the promisee in the sense of an act. In a bilateral
agreement there would be detriment to the promisee in the sense
of a promise. In other words, consideration would then be
synonymous with agreement, and it would really be superfluous
to talk about consideration, for whenever there would be a valid
agreement there would be sufficient consideration. It would in-
clude all the cases of consideration except moral consideration
and injurious reliance, provided no exception was made in favor
of forbearance to sue cases and pre-existing legal duty cases.
The theory that no consideration should be required, but that
all promises should be enforced "which a reasonable man in the
position of the promisee would believe to have been made de-
liberately to assume a binding relation" is advocated strongly by
Dean Pound. He contends that a "man's word in the course of
business should be as good as his bond, and that his fellow-men
must be able to rely on the one equally with the other if our
economic order is to function efficiently."'135 There is no proof
that any kind of consideration is intrinsically necessary for a
contract. One common law contract, the covenant, never had
such a requirement and was not objectionable for that reason.
The Roman law as we have seen, practically took this position.
Countries like Brazil, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, which
recently have adopted civil codes after thorough study have de-
cided to make no requirement of consideration. 136 Hebrew law
made no requirement of consideration for contracts.137 Why
should any kind of consideration be required? The common
law has said so that a man should be paid something for his
promise, but the common law has made this requirement a
subterfuge. Lord Mansfield held that if there was a reason for a
consideration it was for the sake of evidence. 38 As the bargain
'35 Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 276, 282.
136 Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration, 28 Yale L. Jour. 642.
137 41 Am. Law Rev. 717-8.
138 "I take it that the ancient notion about the want of consideration
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theory was worked out in practice, it would seem that it is more
important to make sure that men shall not be held on promises
which they never made than that they receive such a considera-
tion as is found under the bargain theory. Where a promise is
in writing, the position that no consideration should be required
seems to be justified philosophically; and it is supported by
sufficient authority, because it is supported by the cases of con-
tracts under seal and many cases of modern origin' of promises
in writing without the seal. But when we come to oral promises,
it is more difficult to justify the dispensing with consideration,
because if that was done both the requirement of bargain and
the requirement of evidence would be violated. Social interest
demands that social control be applied to oral promises. Hence,
it would seem that the theory that no consideration should be
required for the enforceability of promises, like the others which
have been considered, cannot be adopted as a sole theory.
It appears, therefore, that there is no one theory of considera-
tion which can be adopted for Anglo-American law. In Anglo-
American law we have had many different theories of considera-
tion, and apparently we must continue to have them. Any re-
form of our law will therefore have to adopt some definition of
consideration which will combine a number of different theories.
Confronted with this situation, the writer is inclined to put
contract promises into different classes and to prescribe a differ-
ent kind of consideration for each one. (1) In class 1 he would
put all promises in writing, and for these he would have no
requirement of consideration at all. (2) In class 2 he would
put those promises which have been upheld for what the courts
call moral consideration, and would continue the law as it exists.
(3) In class 3 he would put those promises which have been
enforced because of injurious reliance upon them and would
continue to enforce these promises as they have been historically
enforced and perhaps would allow the law to grow in this field.
(4) In the 4th class, he would put those promises in the form of
agreement and in this class he would require the consideration
of an act or a promise (other than refraining or promising to
was for the sake of evidence only, for when it is reduced into writing, as
in covenants, specialties, bonds, etc., there was no objection to the want of
consideration. And the Statute of Frauds proceeded on the same prin-
ciple. In commercial cases among merchants the want of consideration is
not an objection." Pillans et aZ. v. Van Mierop et a., 3 Burr. 1663.
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refrain from an illegal act) bargained for and given in exchange
for a promise.
Promises in writing should be enforced without consideration
whether under seal or not under seal, because the seal in modern
times has become a form and technicality, if not a surplusage.
The signature of a party is more important than a seal and
should be substituted for it. Contracts under seal never needed
consideration and by the same token a promise in writing with-
out a seal should not need consideration. While the American
Law Institute was not prepared to go to this length, the commis-
sioners on uniform state laws have recommended this reform in
one of its uniform acts.139
In the case of promises enforced for moral consideration and
promises enforced because of injurious reliance, it should be
noted that we have types of promises which do not fall within
any other categories. Consideration is not the only anomaly in the
case of these two types of promises. These promises are not
in the form of agreement. Offer and acceptance are not re-
quired. The fact that the doctrine of moral consideration and
injurious reliance have survived the bargain theory of consid-
eration shows that there is a social interest for their continuance
just as much as there is for the continuance of the contract
under seal.
This leaves the bargain theory of consideration for only those
contracts which are in the form of agreement, and the writer
has tried to simplify consideration here by making consideration
synonymous with offer and acceptance, as re-defined. This would
make a slight change in the law and some people might not be
willing to go so far as to allow this simple doctrine of considera-
tion to obtain in all cases. The American Law Institute, how-
ever, has apparently thought it wise to go this far.140
139 Uniform Written Obligation Act, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 580.
140 The American Law Institute in its restatement of the law of con-
tracts has adopted the bargain theory for consideration and has provided
that any act or promise will be sufficient consideration under the bargain
theory, except (1) Where there is "an act or forbearance required by a
legal duty that is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and reason-
able dispute if the duty is owed either to the promisor or to the public, or,
if imposed by the law of torts or crimes, is owed to any person;" (2) Where
there is "the surrender of, or forbearance to assert an invalid claim or
defense by one who has not an honest and reasonable belief in its possible
validity."
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The writer believes this the best solution of the problem of
consideration for contracts in the form of agreement. The con-
sideration in forbearance to sue cases and pre-existing legal
duty cases is really no different than the consideration in in-
fant's contracts, other voidable contracts, and conditional con-
tracts. In pre-existing legal duty cases between the same parties
and in forbearance to sue cases there is no consideration where
a person promises not to commit malicious prosecution or a
breach of contract. Why? Not because the promisee does not
give up or promise to give up a power, for he does; but because
both a malicious prosecution and a breach of contract are legal
wrongs, and though a person has the power to commit either one
of these and thus impose legal liability upon himself, the refrain-
ing or the promising to refrain from exercising a power to do
an illegal thing will not be allowed by the law to be sufficient
consideration for a promise.141 In other cases the giving up or
the promise to give up of a legal power would be sufficient con-
sideration. But this kind of consideration is just the kind of
consideration which is found in infant's contracts, other void-
able contracts, and conditional contracts. In all of these cases
the promisor promises to give up a legal right, or privilege, or
power, or immunity. If he did not promise to do this but only
promised to give up a legal right, or a privilege, or a power, or
an immunity, if he chose to do so, the promise would be illusory
and like any other illusory promise. Illusory promises are no
promises at all. They answer the requirements neither of agree-
ment nor of the bargain theory of consideration. Hence, there
is no other alternative but to hold that in these types of con-
Where our law now requires the injurious reliance theory and moral
consideration, the American Law Institute rationalizes the subject by pro-
viding that no consideration at all shall be required.
141 It has been contended that in such cases the power to commit a
malicious prosecution or the power to commit a breach of contract would
be sufficient consideration, because the giving up or the promising to give
up of any power would be sufficient consideration but that such a contract
would be void for illegality. The trouble with this explanation is that the
contract if based on bufficient consideration would not be illegal. While it
would be illegal to make a contract to break a contract, or to maliciously
prosecute another, or to murder another, or to commit any other legal
wrong, a contract to refrain from committing a murder, or malicious prose-
cution, or breach of contract would be one whose object would be legal
instead of illegal. Hence, this problem must be solved from the standpoint
of consideration and not from the standpoint of illegality.
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tracts the thing given or promised must be a legal right, or
power, or privilege, or immunity, just the same as in forbearance
to sue and pre-existing legal duty cases. In all of these types
of cases the power of avoidance or disaffirmance is a separate
matter and a power given by the law. It has nothing whatever
to do with consideration or the making of a contract. It relates
merely to performance. The same thing is true of promises on
condition. The condition relates to performance rather than to
the making of a contract. Since the consideration of any act or
promise connotes an act or a promise which is a legal right,
power, privilege, or immunity, there is only this thing which
will amount to a sufficient consideration under the bargain
theory, and because the statement of any act or promise has the
advantage of simplicity and correspondence with offer and
acceptance, it has been chosen without any exceptions (other
than refraining or promising to refrain from an illegal act)
rather than the statement of "a legal right, power, privilege, or
immunity, or the promise thereof."142
It may seem to some that the writer has proposed the aboli-
tion of the requirement of consideration for contracts. Of course
no consideration would be necessary for promises in writing; it
may be that the name consideration should not be given to moral
consideration and injurious reliance; and the only consideration
necessary in contracts created by agreement is possibly that
found in the law of agreement itself. Perhaps this would abolish
consideration. If this would be the result, the writer still would
advocate it. Consideration was not divinely ordered. All the
142 The writer would have preferred to have stated consideration as
the requirement that the act or promise in the law of agreement must be
an act or a promise which includes, or involves, some legal right, power,
privilege, or immunity other than the power to do an illegal act. How-
ever, since the American Law Institute (§ 75) prefers to state considera-
tion in terms of agreement (i. e., act or promise) he has out of deference
followed their statement. But it should be noted that after doing so he
has stated the law of agreement (act or promise) so as to include all
that would have been included if he had stated it in terms of considera-
tion. This must be done for accuracy. The first two exceptions of the
restatement of the American Law Institute (§ 76) he states in terms of
illegality, both because this is the way to rationalize such exceptions and
because the exceptions should be broad enough to include all cases of re-
fraining and promising to refrain from illegality (for example, not to
murder another, or not to commit a battery, or a conversion, or a tres-
pass, etc.).
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different forms of consideration are accidental. Their abolition
would not wreck the legal work. Yet, the writer does not advo-
cate the application of social control to all promises intended as
a business transaction. This would involve the abolition of
agreement (offer and acceptance) as well as consideration. Per-
haps all men should have the right to rely upon such statements
of others. If this should ever become social policy it might work
well enough. But the law of agreement has proven satisfactory
and is too thoroughly imbedded in our traditions to be given
up unless social interest demands it. In the case of ordinary
oral promises, not only is there no such demand, but, for the
sake of evidence if not for bargain, social interest seems to re-
quire something more than a mere promise.
